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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on asset quality of Islamic
banks by employing data on 129 Islamic banks from 29 countries spanning the period
from 2008 to 2017. The study shows that asset quality of Islamic banks is positively and
significantly sensitive to an increase in board independence, Shariah board, and audit
committee effectiveness. The study finds that female participation in management as
CEOs seems to detract from good performance and that more board meetings can
be harnessed to improve banks’ asset quality. These empirical findings have practical
policy implications regarding asset quality management and board construction
within the Islamic banking sector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic challenge of corporate governance and its relation to performance
have attained ever-growing popularity during the two decades (Aslam and Haron,
2020). A fundamental limitation of this comprehensive literature is an inability to
portray how professional and social correspondence between board individuals
affect the capacity of board members to perform their obligations and to avoid
corporate scandals. Corporate scandals have an impact on both the investor’s
certainty and economic recessions, and hence highlight the utmost significance
of corporate governance across firms (Nomran and Haron, 2020) and the banking
sector. A delicate corporate governance system and extreme risk-taking exposures
enhance the banking sector unsteadiness and economic losses; this reinforces the
need for effective corporate governance practices in the banking sector (Aslam
and Haron, 2020b). Rehman et al. (2020) discussed that a board demanding a good
governance structure could send a positive signal to the market as well as provide
good advice to management, which could significantly contribute to sustainable
banking performance through strategic decision-making leads.
Likewise, corporate governance and asset quality in the banking sector have
recently received extraordinary attention from enterprises, governments and
worldwide associations, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
of 2007/2008 (Chazi et al., 2018). Noteworthy, the conventional banking sector
has been negatively impacted by the financial crisis, whereas the Islamic banking
sector has remained stable and less vulnerable due its unique structure.1 Despite
the exponential growth of Islamic banks, they face challenges of assets deficiency
(Fiador and Sarpong-Kumankoma, 2020). Thus, it is the failure of management to
antagonistic for any bank to deploy their assets within the pre-defined timeframe
(Ahamed, 2017). Therefore, bank loans are viewed as an advantage for banks;
however, the presence of non-performing loans will disintegrate the nature of
the benefits of bank loans. Non-performing loans create adverse liquidity effects,
which in turn distress the banks’, particularly reducing their future profits. Thus,
a bank’s asset quality is one of the imperative measures used in deciding the wellbeing of the bank (Aspiranti and Amaliah, 2019).
The rapid growth of the Islamic financial industry has spurred scholarly
interest in the issue of asset quality in Islamic banks (Naushad and Malik, 2015).
The Islamic banking industry faces more competition. This intense competition
turns into the primary driver of the development and steadiness of banks in the
Islamic banking industry (Ahamed, 2017). In line with this reasoning, a challenge
for the boards of Islamic banks is ensuring that all their banks’ operations are
compliant with Shariah law (prohibition of interest, gambling, and excessive risk);
in attempts to be Sharia law compliant, Islamic banks experience decreasing asset
efficiency (Ahmad et al., 2018; Chazi et al., 2018). John et al. (2016) recommend
future research to explore the role of directors’/boards’ in promoting asset quality
of the banking sector. This study is motivated to fill this research gap in the
literature and to offers an enhanced understanding regarding the role of directors/
boards in the Islamic banks’ asset quality. Our study draws on the insights of
1

Juhro et al. (2020) outline some unique features of Islamic stocks (issued by banks and non-banks)
that make them resilient to shocks.
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the ‘resource dependence theory’ and argues that Islamic banks can sustain their
asset quality through good corporate governance structure because boardroom
capabilities (important information, aptitude, and skill) and a better capacity
to relieve the competitive uncertainties maintain sound loan profiles in Islamic
banks. Specifically, good corporate governance fosters national and international
trust of the customers and community, which is an indispensable requisite for the
development of Islamic banks.
This study has several contributions. First, the evidence put forth by this
study contributes to the literature on both corporate governance and banking by
proposing an efficient board mechanism to enhance the banks’ ability to improve
their asset quality. Second, this study controls for unobserved endogeneity and
heterogeneity, which were missed by the large portion of the literature. Third, we
examine how effective the dual board structure in Islamic banks is, by estimating
the statistical significance of the interaction term between the regular board of
directors and Sharia board on the asset quality of Islamic banks. Lastly, as opposed
to prior studies, this study examines how bank risk varies across four different
continents by using diverse and updated data concerning Europe and Central
Asia, Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), non-GCC Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia. This permits our study to assess
whether disparities in the cross-regional regulatory frameworks, legal systems,
and Islamic banking practices lead to disparities in risk-taking behaviour between
and conventional and Islamic banks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II shows some of the
leading measures of corporate governance along with the hypothesis. Section III
presents the data and methodology of the study. Section IV presents the results
on the relationship of corporate governance and asset quality of Islamic banks.
Finally, Section V concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Asset Quality of Banks
A steady banking system is essential for effective financial intermediation. Banks
are dissimilar to assembling organizations; they sell credit and make a profit
on their credit (advances). Thus, loans and advances are considered significant
resources possessed by banks. Islamic banks’ financing and advances in the form
of sale, partnership, trade, and services are subject to Shariah compliance (Ahmad
et al., 2018; Aslam and Haron, 2020). Therefore, there is a dire need for the banking
sector to adequately oversee their (Islamic banks) financing (loans) to achieve
its core objectives (Fiador and Sarpong-Kumankoma, 2020). As banks keep on
financing, they are consistently susceptible to the risk of default from borrowers
(Abdulazeez et al., 2019).
Several previous studies discussed asset quality in different dimensions. The
study of Chazi et al. (2018) explored the core risks faced by banks, investors, and
clients due to loan default. Several of the past studies identify the vital measures of
banks’ asset quality, which include: loan to deposit, loan to assets, non-performing
loans to net loans, and non-performing loan to assets (Abdulazeez et al., 2019;
Fakhrunnas and Ramly, 2017; Tarchouna et al., 2017). According to Abdulazeez et
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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al. (2019), for better asset quality, banks should maintain the loan to deposit ratio
below 85%, and non-performing loan to net loans below 5%. Moreover, Fiador and
Sarpong-Kumankoma (2020) explained that banks with better asset quality have a
low ratio of loans to total loans. Tarchouna et al. (2017) show that banks with a high
ratio of loans to total assets take more risk to generate profit.
B. Corporate Governance and Asset Quality of Banks
Prior studies demonstrated that corporate governance is an essential determinant
of financial performance and firm outcomes (Abdulazeez et al., 2019). Additionally,
governance also entails frameworks and structures to lessen the issue of agency
problems emerging among investors and the board of an organization (Ahamed,
2017). At the bank level, we expect that banks with better board structure will
make better decisions, which will boost the banks’ wealth. Thus, the viability of
a board in executing its managerial obligations is affected by some other board
features to a great extent. These features are board-related such as independence,
size, committees, gender, qualification, meetings, and Shariah board (Aslam et
al., 2019; John et al., 2016). In view of the current interests of banks, this study
analyses the role of board independence, board size, CEO duality, Shariah board,
and audit committee in improving the asset quality of Islamic banks. Therefore,
our discussion primarily explores the following factors.
B1. Board Size
Aslam and Haron (2020b) explained that the board size (executives) of an
organization forms the board’s structure. Prior studies discussed the right and
optimal board size in an organization, but this remains elusive. Organizations
ascertained their ideal board size according to the trade-off among expenses
and advantages for a larger and smaller board. Some firms accomplish better
with larger boards since they face complications and require the advisory role
of professional boards (Chazi et al., 2018; Mollah et al., 2017). Naushad and Malik
(2015) documented that larger boards might be valuably possessing a vast array
of knowledge, aptitudes, experience, and the expertise to advise the management
to make better decisions in the interest of firms. Some earlier studies reported that
smaller boards are valuable because larger boards have unreasonable control over
CEOs and obstruct the adequacy of their decision making (Farag et al., 2018). Chazi
et al. (2018) reported that a large board size does not just expand board cost, board
repetition, and the issue of free-riding from inept board individuals, it creates
additionally pointless board debates emerging from contradictions. Considering
the conclusions of prior studies, we deduct that Islamic bank required a larger
board to make efficient strategic decisions in a competitive environment. Thus, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Larger boards exert a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks.
B2. Board Independence
Board independence is a significant component of board composition, measured
as the total outside directors share in the board (Tarchouna et al., 2017). Farag et al.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/6
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(2018) documented that non-executive directors provided more effectual advisory
and monitoring role that is unavailable within the organization. Tarchouna et al.
(2017) found that organizations possessed higher asset quality because of active
monitoring role of outside directors. Moreover, Wang et al. (2012) stated that board
independence has a positive and significant effect on the asset quality of the US
bank holding companies. Hence, Almutairi and Quttainah (2017) documented that
outside directors are less compelling for observance being subject to the CEO for
their career growth. Mollah et al. (2017) pointed out that non-executive directors
help to encourage the exchange of data between the management and directors.
A high proportion of outside directors could, thus, weaken the performance of
the advisory tasks in the organization (Aslam, and Haron, 2020b). Tarchouna et
al. (2017) additionally found a noteworthy negative connection between board
independence and non-performing loans. Their outcomes are consistent with
those of Japanese insider-ruled corporate administration highlights. Thus, the
study of Aslam and Haron (2020b) found that board independence is primarily
related to banking industry using data from several OECD countries. This study
hypothesises that the Islamic financial industry utilises board independence
effectively. This hypothesis is stated as follows.
H2: Board independence exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks.
B3. CEO Duality
CEO duality exists when the CEO of an association additionally serves or acts
as the chairman of the board (Grassa and Matoussi, 2014). In this manner, the
CEO wields absolute power and supremacy over all corporate decisions. Thus,
separating the roles of the CEO and the Chairman will improve responsibility, as
the autonomous board will fill in to keep an eye on the activities and decisions of
the firm through joint participation thereby guaranteeing that investors’ interest
is very much ensured (Al-Malkawi and Pillai, 2018). Nguyen et al. (2015) argued
that board duality and partitioning of roles have their own merits and demerits.
They also contended that combining the two positions will energize a substantial
initiative and improve an organisation’s performance over the long haul. Similarly,
Tarchouna et al. (2017) stated that in the presence of board duality and a strong
executive, there exists an immediate connection between corporate proficiency
and execution. In this spirit, we predict that board duality has a beneficial impact
on the asset quality of the Islamic banks (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017). Our
hypothesis is formulated as follows.
H3: CEO duality exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks.
B4. Audit Committee
Audit committee is a standing committee of governance that is established to
enhance the financial accountability, unwavering quality, and transparency in
organisations, whereby the auditor and the management strengthen the financial
reporting in the organizations according to the general accounting and legal
standards (AlSagr et al., 2018). It also serves as a scaffold in the correspondence
network among auditors and board of directors as well as enable them to adequately
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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check the power of the board with specific reference to the accounting standards
(Rehman et al., 2021). Therefore, the Combined Code (2008) suggested that all listed
organizations have a completely independent audit committee. Several studies
found conflicting results by analysing the appropriate audit committee size and
financial reporting (Al-Karasneh, 2018). For instance, Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018)
demonstrated that larger audit committees are bound to withstand pressures of
management conspiracy and have the option to give more consideration to the
overall financial accounting process. Thus, regulatory bodies also believe that
audit committee size is a significant component of controlling the accounting
process. Hence, the study of Alam and Haron (2020) reported that large size
committees depend on a more extensive information base, changed aptitude, and
subsequently attempt their job even more successfully. Along with this discussion,
we believe that the audit committee plays a significant role in improving the asset
quality of Islamic banks and hence we formulate our hypothesis as follows.
H4: Larger audit committees exert a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks.
B5. Shariah Board
Islamic banks have double layer governance structure: the regular board of
directors and Shariah board. The ordinary board perform like a regular bank
board. Yet, it works under the two-tier governance structure—the regular board
of directors inside the strict parameters set out by the Shariah board (Nomran and
Haron, 2020). The job of the Shariah board is to implement and ensure Islamic
standards at all levels of board and evaluating the performance Mollah et al. (2017).
The Shariah board ensures great corporate governance for an Islamic bank. Thus,
the primary function of the Shariah board to complies with all the transaction of
Islamic banks in accordance with Islamic law and avoid the violation of Shariah.
The resource dependence theory proposes that a larger Shariah board size brings
diverse knowledge and experience, which enable the board to provide better
quality guidance and counsel to the organizations (Rehman et al., 2021). Moreover,
several studies stated that larger Shariah boards have professional knowledge and
a good understanding of Islamic law that enable them to take better decisions to
improve the banking efficiency (Mollah et al., 2017; Nomran and Haron, 2020).
Accordingly, the study hypothesizes that:
H5: Large Shariah board size exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic
banks.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Data Collection Procedure
The sample contains all listed Islamic banks in the Bankscope database spanning
the period from 2008 to 2017. The internal governance-related data are collected
from banks’ annual reports, which are openly available on their websites, and
the financial data are obtained through the Bankscope database. Data on the
macroeconomic variables are collected from the World Bank Indicators (WDI)
database. We construct a balanced panel dataset and removed all those banks
with missing accounting and governance data as well as those that are unalive
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/6
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throughout the sample period. Moreover, we also eliminate all Islamic investment
banks and Modarabah funds from the sampling frame. This procedure results in a
balanced panel of 129 Islamic banks from 29 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) countries, yielding 1290 observations, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1.
Study Sample
This table shows the sample of Islamic banks from 29 OIC countries.

Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Countries

Numbers of IBs

Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam
Egypt
Libya
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Malaysia
Maldives
Mauritania
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Turkey
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen
Total Sampled of Islamic Banks

1
14
5
3
3
2
8
3
7
7
2
1
4
15
2
1
1
2
9
6
5
1
9
1
1
7
4
2
3
129

B. The Variables
In this study, we collected data on Loan to Assets (LAS), Loan To Deposit (LTD), and
Non-Performing Loan to net loans (NPLR), which are recognized as the measures
of banks’ asset quality in the literature (Al-Karasneh, 2018; Fakhrunnas and
Ramly, 2017). The explanatory variables are Board Independence (BIND), Board
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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Size (BS), CEO Duality (CD), Shariah Board (SB), and Audit Committee (AUDC),
following the previous research (Aslam and Haron, 2020a; Aslam et al., 2019).
Control variables are bank-specific (market share, net profit, size, and leverage)
and board features (gender and board meetings, and country-specific features
(GDP and inflation) selected from previous studies on corporate governance
and asset quality (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017; Farag et al., 2018; Grassa and
Matoussi, 2014; Mahmood et al., 2014; Mollah et al., 2017; Shabbir et al., 2020). Table
2 summarizes all variables used in this study.
Table 2.
The Variables
This table describes the variables used in this study. These variables are divided into three categories. The first
category has the corporate governance mechanism-related independent variables. The second category has asset
quality-related dependent variables. The third category has the control variables, which is categorised into bankspecific, board-specific, and macroeconomic variables.

Variables
Board Size
Board
Independence
CEO Duality
Shariah Board
Audit Committee

Labels
Definition
Corporate governance mechanisms (Independent variables)
BS

Total number of members on the board

BIND

Total number of members of non-executive directors

CD
SB
AUDC

If the CEO also holds chairman position, then the value is one and if
not then the value is zero
Total number of members of Shariah Board
Total number of members in the audit committee

Bank asset quality indicators (Dependent variables)
Loan to assets
Loan to deposit
Non-performing
loan to net loans

LAS
LTD

Ratio of average total loans to average total assets
Ratio of average total loans to average total customer deposits

NPLR

Ratio of non-performing loans to net loans

Bank characteristics (Control variables)
Bank Size
Leverage
Net Profit
Market Share
Foreign ownership

BKS
LEV
NP
MKS
FOWN

Natural log of total bank assets
Proportion of total debt over equity
Total revenue minus total expenses
Share of assets of each bank to total banks’ assets
A binary variable that takes the value of one if foreign firms have an
ownership in the Islamic bank or zero otherwise

Board features (Control variables)
Gender

GEND

Board Meetings

BM

Inflation
Country Growth

CPI
GDP

If the CEO is male the value is one and if the CEO is female, then the
value is zero
Total number of board meetings

Macroeconomic features (Control variables)
Natural log of the consumer price index
Natural log of total gross domestic product

C. Model Specification
To address endogeneity and heterogeneity problems, the 2SYS-GMM estimator is
employed and the following specifications are tested:
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/6
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(1)

(2)

(3)

where i denotes the Islamic banks (i=1,...,129) and t denotes the years (t = 2008
,⋯,2017). LAS is a loan to assets, LTD loan to deposit, NPLR is a non-performing
loan to net loans indicator of the asset quality of Islamic banks. CG denotes the
corporate governance variables. X indicates the control variables (gender, board
meetings, market share, net profit, bank size, leverage, GDP, inflation) and is the
error term. Because the estimated standard errors using the 2SYS-GMM estimator
can be bias downwards, we employ the finite sample correction for the variancecovariance matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Our preliminary descriptive analysis shows that the mean ratio of Loan to Assets
(LAS) is approximately 50.4% and varies between 4.4% to 1020%.2 The mean
of Loan To Deposit (LTD) is almost 418% and varies between 1.5% to 2051%.
Additionally, the average of Non-Performing Loans to net loans (NPLR) is 403%
and varies between 326% to 3176%. Concerning corporate governance, the average
Board Size (BS) is 8.5 and varies between 5 to 21. Moreover, the average of Board
Independence (BIND) is 4.5 and varies between 3 to 13. The mean value of the
Shariah board is 3.71 and varies between 2 to 11. The average size of the audit
committee is 3.46 and varies between 2 to 7. Moreover, the average size of CEO
Duality, board meeting, gender is 0.17, 4, and 0.86, respectively. Turning to the
bank and macroeconomic variables, the mean bank size, leverage, market share,
net profit, GDP, and inflation, and foreign ownership are, respectively, 6.08, 7.06,
2.06, 0.05, 27.91, 4.74, and 0.20.
E. Correlation Statistics
From the correlation analysis, we find that non-executive directors’ indicator
has the highest correlation (0.69) with board size.3 Thus, none of the correlation
coefficients exceeds 0.69; therefore, we conclude that collinearity between the
variables is not a concern, as suggested by Gujarati (2009). Additionally, we find
that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of all explanatory variables is less than 10.
2
3

The full results are withheld but are available on request.
The results are available on request.
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Based on this, there is no concern of multi-collinearity among the regressors, as
suggested by Wooldridge (2005).4
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 reports the results of the 2SYS-GMM estimation of the effect of corporate
governance on Islamic banks’ asset quality in Equations (1) and (2). For each
regression, the diagnostic test satisfies the condition that instruments are
uncorrelated and that the error terms are different across models. In addition,
the AR (1) and (2) test results show absence of autocorrelation problems across
models, as suggested by the literature (Nomran and Haron, 2020; Aslam and
Haron, 2020b). The lag values of LAS, LTD, and NPLR are positive and statistically
significant in all models, indicating that the past year’s LAS, LTD, and NPLR
values significantly enhance the current year’s LAS, LTD, and NPLR values of
Islamic banks.
Table 3 indicates that Board Size (BS)is negatively related to the loan to assets
value of the Islamic banks. These results support the finding of Almutairi and
Quttainah (2017): board size reduces asset quality of banks. Thus, the negative
relationship might be because of Islamic banks’ directors who avoid taking
excessive risk and avoid non-Shariah compliant investment. On the other hand,
BS is positively related to the loan to deposit value of Islamic banks, in line with
the finding of Abdulazeez et al. (2019) on Nigeria. This result indicates that a larger
board enhances the Islamic banks’ asset quality measured in terms of LTD. Also,
BS has a negative and significant relationship with Non-Performing Loan to net
loans (NPLR) value of the Islamic banks, consistent with the findings of Tarchouna
et al. (2017) in the USA. This result indicates that board size is characterized by
diversified skills and experience, which enable them to reduce the ratio of nonperforming loans in Islamic banks.
Board Independence (BIND) is positively related to the asset quality of Islamic
banks measured in terms of LAS and LTD. The results support the argument
put forward Chazi et al. (2018) that more independent boards improve the asset
quality of banks. Thus, a more independent board is more competent and has
diversified knowledge in utilizing assets properly and hence improves the wealth
of Islamic banks. BIND is negatively related to NPLR, supporting the findings
of Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) on Southeast Asian banks. This result signifies
that board independence helps the Islamic banks to reduce their non-performing
loans. CEO Duality (CD) is positively related to LAS and LTD, consistent with
the findings of Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018) on Qatar that CEO duality improves
the asset quality of banks. Moreover, CD is negatively related to NPLR, which is
similar to the findings of Grove et al. (2011) showing that CEO duality improves
the asset value of banks. This result indicates that one manager has more power to
make better decision to enhance the asset quality of Islamic banks.

4

These results are also available on request.
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Table 3.
Impact of Corporate Governance on Asset Quality (2SYS-GMM)
This table reports estimates of Equations (1) to (3) using the 2SYS GMM estimator. Equations (1) to (3) are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
***, **, and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. AR (1) and (2) and Hansen
test results are reported in parentheses.

Variable
Loan to assets
Loan to deposit
Non-performing loan to net loan
Board size
Board Independence
CEO duality
Shariah board
Audit committee
CEO gender
Board meeting
Bank size
Leverage
Net profit
Market share
Foreign ownership
Inflation
GDP
Constant
Year dummy
Crisis dummy
Observations
Number of Individuals
Number of Instruments
AR (1) test statistics (p-value)
AR (2) test statistics (p-value)
Hansen test (p-value)

Model 1
Loan to assets

Model 2
Loan to deposit

Model 3
Non-performing
loan to net loan

0.0984***
0.3228***
-0.0539***
0.0352***
0.1018**
0.0411***
0.0931
0.1060***
0.0019**
-0.0183***
0.0091***
-0.0187***
0.6384***
0.2597***
-0.0161***
0.0124*
0.0548***
Yes
Yes
1165
129
8
0.1728
0.2513
0.3718

0.6968***
0.3468***
9.1257***
1.1241***
2.2544***
2.6692***
1.2133***
0.1857
-0.0527*
-0.3664***
7.1486***
8.2465***
-0.4425***
1.6073***
0.76005***
Yes
Yes
1165
129
9
0.0749
0.2405
0.2665

0.1473***
-0.6225**
-1.5447***
-11.2518***
-1.7584***
-4.8889***
-2.0594*
0.0021*
-0.2834
-0.0925
1.0287***
-23.4225***
-13.4985***
-0.3553
0.3939
-0.9007***
Yes
Yes
1171
129
9
0.3025
0.3782
0.6494

Shariah Board (SB) is positively related to LAS and LTD. These results support
the finding of Naushad and Malik (2015) that larger Shariah boards improve
the asset quality of Islamic banks. Moreover, SB is negatively related to NPLR,
supporting the findings of Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) for Southeast Asian
Islamic banks. Thus, the present results signify that SB fosters a positive managerial
behaviour to improve the asset quality of Islamic banks by offering additional
support to boards. On the other hand, AUDC is positively associated with LTD but
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is not associated with LAS. These results support theoretical arguments and are
similar to the finding of Wang et al. (2012) and Tarchouna et al. (2017) for the USA.
The present findings indicate that large audit committee size helps the Islamic
banks to reduce their non-performing loans. Moreover, these are consistent with
the resource dependence theory that large independence audit committees have
the latitude of making informed decisions, detecting errors and can easily facilitate
effective work and provide unbiased judgment, resulting in improved asset quality
of Islamic banks.
For the control variables, we observe that gender is positively related to LAS
and LTD but negatively associated with NPLR. These results support the finding
of Grassa and Matoussi (2014) that male CEOs have a beneficial effect on the
asset quality of the banks. Board meetings are positively related to LAS and LTD,
consistent with Aslam and Haron (2020a) that more board meetings improve
the value of Islamic banks. Bank size is negatively associated with LAS, which
contradicts evidence in Abdulazeez et al. (2019). This result indicates that as the
size of the bank increases, the size of non-performing loans increases and in turn
deteriorates asset quality of the Islamic banks. Leverage is negatively related to
LAS and LTD suggesting that a high ratio of debt has a detrimental effect on the
asset quality of Islamic banks, consistent with Aslam and Haron (2020b) that more
debt decreases the performance of Islamic banks.
Net profit has a negative relation with LAS and LTD but a positive one with
NPLR. These results imply that an increase in profit decreases the asset quality of
Islamic banks. One of the possible reasons for this reduction effect of an increase in
profit on asset quality is that an increase in bank lending simultaneously increases
profit and the ratio of bad debt. Market share is positively associated with LAS and
LTD, but is negatively related to NPLR. These results indicate that a large share of
Islamic banks in the market enhances the asset quality of Islamic banks, consistent
with the finding of Aslam and Haron (2020a) in OIC countries. Foreign ownership
is positively associated with LAS and LTD, which supports the finding of Aslam
and Haron, (2020) that, in the presence of foreign ownership, banks perform more
efficiently and thus have better asset quality of Islamic banks. Inflation carries a
negative relation with LAS and LTD indicating that high inflation decreases the
asset quality of Islamic banks because people are unable to pay their debt. GDP
positively impacts LAS and LTD, consistent with Mollah et al. (2017).
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, we estimate our models using the one-step first-difference
Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM) estimator to investigate the
robustness of our results in Table 65. We find that the coefficients of other CG
variables, including board size, board independence, CEO duality are unchanged,
in terms of direction and magnitude. All the asset quality lag variables, namely
LAS, LTD, and NPLR, have a positive effect on the performance of Islamic banks,
similar to the estimates in Table 3. The coefficients of the control variables in this
case have similar directions and significance as those reported in Table 3.
5

These estimates are available on request.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is an ongoing debate regarding the role of corporate governance in improving
the value of corporations, especially after the global financial crisis of 2008. Weak
corporate governance in the financial sector was deemed as the principal root of
the global financial crisis of 2008, and this corporate governance weakness is not
limited to the commercial banks—it extends to Islamic banks as well. Therefore,
this study adds to the debate about the significant role of corporate governance
in improving the asset quality in Islamic banks by using a panel dataset of 129
Islamic banks operating in 29 OIC countries spanning 2008 to 2017. Based on the
2SYS-GMM estimator, we find that the lag values of loan to assets, loan to deposit,
and non-performing loans to net loans have a positive and significant effect on the
present values of loan to assets, loan to deposits, and non-performing loans to net
loans of Islamic banks. We find that board independence, Shariah board, and audit
committee play a significant role in enhancing the asset quality of Islamic banks.
Still, board size and CEO duality have effects on the asset quality of Islamic banks.
Thus, the findings indicate that reliable corporate governance mechanisms play a
pivotal role in enhancing the asset quality of the Islamic banks.
Sequel to the present empirical evidence, this study would help the banks in
developing appropriate strategies to improve their asset quality. In essence, larger
board sizes may be beneficial to Islamic banks if they are motivated to utilize
their services and their expertise to add value. It is also imperative that the board
independence would ensure the effective monitoring of the activities of the board,
specifically concerning the credit department. Audit committee and Shariah board
can foster positive managerial behaviours and asset quality of Islamic banks
by offering additional support to the boards. They also increase the reliability,
credibility, and legitimacy of Islamic banks, which boost the confidence of the
investors, and as a result, improve banks’ value. Moreover, male as CEOs take
more reliable decisions than females, according to the results. This means, in some
sense, that the role of female CEOs requires further investigation to map out the
part of gender in the Islamic banking sector. Finally, more board meetings enhance
the asset value of banks by efficiently monitoring the credit-related operation in
the banks.
This study encourages the policymakers, regulators, and practitioners of
Islamic banks to adopt effective governance mechanism to boost the asset quality
of the Islamic banking industry.
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